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COMMENT
POSTMODERN PIRACY:
HOW COPYRIGHT LAW CONSTRAINS
CONTEMPORARY ART
"If I was greedy, I would have copied a Picasso."'
I. INTRODUCTION
For many styles of contemporary art, United States copyright law
does not provide adequate protection. Rather, the Copyright Act of 1976,
coupled with judicial interpretations of that statute, has inadvertently created
an atmosphere in which several forms of contemporary art are endangered.
In 1992, the Second Circuit decided Rogers v. Koons,2 in which sculptor
Jeff Koons was held to have infringed a photograph copyrighted by Art
Rogers. This opinion, the first to consider the art of appropriation, may
serve as the blueprint from which a significant movement of postmodern
art is destroyed.
Jeff Koons has been called everything from a "kitsch artist"3 to a
"master of schlock."4  His unique position in the contemporary art
marketplace draws both praise and criticism: "His supporters depict him
as a Wunderkind whose stark postmodernism descends from the best in
American and European art. His critics call him market-driven, among
other things." Koons, a former commodities broker on Wall Street,6
creates works of art that are driven by financial motives. He charges
outlandish prices for his works and easily sells them to willing collectors.7
1. Jeff Koons, quoted in Ronald Sullivan, Appeals Court Rules Artist Pirated Picture of
Puppies, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1992, at B3.
2. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub. nom. Koons v. Rogers,
113 S.Ct. 365 (1992).
3. Jeff Bater, People, UNrrED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, Apr. 3, 1992.
4. Adrian Dannat, Art/ The 'Mine' Field, THE INDEPENDENT, Mar. 23, 1992, at 20.
5. Constance L. Hays, A Picture, a Sculpture and a Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1991, at
B2.
6. Gail Appleson, U.S. Court Calls Sculptor Koons a Pirate, Upholds Copyright Case, THE
REtrER LIBRARY REPORT, Apr. 2, 1992.
7. Id.
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Arguably a descendant of the postmodem aesthetic developed by Marcel
Duchamp,8 Koons finds the practice of "appropriating" other works to be
artistically valid.9 Although Jeff Koons is a significant figure in the art
world and his works are representative of a prominent form of artistic
expression,' ° in copyright terms, Koons is an infringer.
This Article will examine how Koons' art exemplifies the tension
between a prevalent artistic tradition and fundamental principles of
copyright law. Part 11 briefly traces the development of postmodernism."
Part Il analyzes the range of copyright protection extended to artistic
works. 2 Part IV discusses the impact of Rogers v. Koons on postmodem
expression,13 with special emphasis on the fair use defense 4 and avail-
able remedies. 5 Part V looks to the future and examines some fronts on
which artists may encounter restrictive copyright laws.' 6
1. THE RISE OF POSTMODERN ART
Postmodem art has taken many forms in its rise to prominence,
replacing the Modernist art of the early twentieth century. Postmodernism
originally derived from the use of "found objects."' 7 These objects, which
could be man-made or natural, were altered minimally or left untouched by
the artist and then offered as works of art. 8 Artists such as Jasper Johns
and Andy Warhol used commercial items and institutional symbols in their
paintings. 9 Minimalist sculptors use construction materials, usually wood,
wire, or metal, and exhibit works with minor or no modifications.'
Conceptual artists use language and popular phraseology in their installa-
8. See infra notes 57-64 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
10. "[C]ritics say his work follows such artists as Marcel Duchamp and Andy Warhol, who
took common, everyday objects and transformed them into art." Sullivan, supra note 1, at B3.
As the Second Circuit noted, "[hie is a controversial artist hailed by some as a 'modem
Michelangelo' ... ." Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d at 304.
11. See infra notes 17-117 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 118-34 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 135-287 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 213-63 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 264-87 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 288-343 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 27-64 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 27-64 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 46-64 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
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tions. "Earthworks" artists create works of art in nature, either by
displacing a natural landscape or installing sculptural material in an outdoor
context 22  Performance artists combine elements of theater with more
conventional forms of visual art to produce a hybrid of theater, choreo-
graphy, and sculpture. 2 In New York, artists like Mark Kostabi24 and
Jeff Koons practice art as an outlet of capitalist society, where the monetary
value of an artwork defines its aesthetic validity.' By incorporating
financial values into art, Koons and his peers follow the postmodernist
style. Ever since the time of Duchamp, postmodern artists have stressed
the idea behind the art as the primary motivation for its creation, rather than
championing the work itself.'
A. The Roots of Postmodernism
Pablo Picasso is generally credited with opening the door to
abstraction with his experiments in Cubism and his rejection of traditional
figuration.2' His paintings in the first two decades of the Twentieth
Century were transitional works that defined the Modernist aesthetic while
inadvertently setting the stage for an even bolder artistic message.'
Freed from the tyranny of trompe l'oei19 by Picasso's example,
French artist Marcel Duchamp formulated a radical philosophy of art."
Duchamp's guiding principle was that art was whatever an artist proclaimed
it to be."' By 1914, Duchamp had become "constantly obsessed with the
question of what it is that 'makes' a work of art. 312  To this end, he
produced his first "readymade" work, "Bottle Rack," which consisted of an
21. See infra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
22. See H.W. JANSON, HISTORY OF ART 742-43 (3d ed. 1986); infra notes 71-87 and
accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 88-113 and accompanying text.
24. See Cathy Curtis, O.C. Art; Kostabi Works on View in Fullerton; The Artist's Notoriety
is Based Largely on Kastabi World the Assembly Line Enterprise He Founded, L.A. TIMEs, Nov.
19, 1990, at Fl.
25. See infra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
26. Clement Greenberg, Avant-Garde and Kitsch, in POLuOCK AND AFrER THE CRITCAL
DEBATE 21 (Francis Frascina ed., 1985); see infra notes 27-56 and accompanying text.
27. JANSON, supra note 22, at 681.
28. JANSON, supra note 22, at 681.
29. "[A] style of painting in which objects are depicted with photographically realistic detail."
WEBSTER'S NINm NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1265 (1990).
30. ROSALIND E. KRAUSS, PASSAGEs IN MODERN ScULpuRE 72 (1989).
31. JANSON, supra note 22, at 693.
32. KRAUSS, supra note 30, at 72.
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industrial bottle rack signed by Duchamp 3 "The signed bottle rack...
was transferred from the realm of ordinary objects into the realm of art by
the mere fact of its having been inscribed by the artist."'  Duchamp had
created an original work of art by taking an object manufactured entirely
by someone else and placing it into an artistic context.3"
Duchamp's most influential work, 'The Fountain" (1917), is a urinal
turned sideways and signed "R. Mutt."'36 The urinal is a "found object"37
appropriated by Duchamp and turned into art. "The Fountain" perhaps best
exemplifies the roots of postmodernism: 'The viewer has to realize that an
act of transfer has occurred-an act in which the object has been transplant-
ed from the ordinary world into the realm of art."38 The main thrust of
this art lies in the process of appropriation rather than in the creation of the
work by the artist.39 It is not necessary for the artist to have produced,
from raw materials, the work presented as "art." Rather, any object can
become a work of art by being incorporated into an artistic context.'
In 1939, the eminent art historian Clement Greenberg published an
article that, for the first time, effectively defined the ideological underpin-
nings of the aesthetic conceived by Duchamp.41 Greenberg's article
legitimized the burgeoning movement away from the prevailing Modernist
aesthetic, which took hold despite the best efforts of Duchamp to champion
"readymade" works.4' In Greenberg's analysis, a "found object," once
incorporated into a work of art, is inseparable from the idea that motivated
33. KRAUSS, supra note 30, at 72.
34. KRAUSS, supra note 30, at 72.
35. KRAUSS, supra note 30, at 72.
36. KRAUSS, supra note 30, at 76.
37. A "found object" is any item an artist takes from a non-artistic context and incorporates
into a "readymade" work of art. Examples include blocks of wood, wire, soup cans, and sheets
of corrugated metal.
38. KRAUSS, supra note 30, at 77.
39. See JANsoN, supra note 22, at 693.
40. KRAUSS, supra note 30, at 80.
41. Greenberg, supra note 26, at 23 (emphasis in original).
42. Greenberg argued:
It has been in search of the absolute that the avant-garde has arrived at 'abstract'
or 'non-objective' art--and poetry, too. The avant-garde poet or artist tries in
effect to imitate God by creating something valid solely on its own terms in the
way nature itself is valid . . . something given, increate, independent of
meanings, sinilars, or originals. Content is to be dissolved so completely into
form that the work of art or literature cannot be reduced in whole or in part to
anything not itself.
Greenberg, supra note 26, at 23 (emphasis in original).
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the artist.43 Therefore, any object, not just something created specifically
as art, can have artistic value. Greenberg argued that a natural occurrence,
such as a sunset, is "aesthetically valid," and can be captured by an artist
who wishes to exploit its inherent artistic qualities.' As Duchamp
showed, even a urinal has the same potential to become art; it only takes
the artist's idea to transform the object into art.4"
Although Picasso and his Modernist peers dominated artistic thought
throughout the 1950s,"6 each new generation of artists experimented with
postmodern styles.4' In 1954, Jasper Johns48 painted the first of a series
of American flags.49 Several of the paintings consisted solely of a single,
complete flag.5" Johns challenged the viewer to make a choice: is this
thing a painting of a flag or is this thing itself a flag?"' The subject
matter, in effect, became part of the form of the art, and the idea that
sparked the expression was inextricably linked to the look of the painting.
Although works like "Flag" are indisputably artistic, the message of the
artist lies in the idea behind the painting, rather than in the painting itself.
Unlike Duchamp, Johns created this series of paintings without using
"readymade" materials.52 His symbolism, however, is appropriated from
traditional notions of the American flag. The very idea of this art is
"found" by the artist, and Johns' social critique is strengthened by his use
of the very symbols he is criticizing.
Eventually, the use of "found objects" and the redefinition of art as
a philosophical statement became a driving force within the art world.
Many artists, such as Claes Oldenburg, Roy Lichtenstein, and James
Rosenquist, 3 began to experiment with commercial methods of expres-
sion. They copied styles used in advertisements, comic books, and other
aspects of popular culture to create works whose ideological underpinnings
43. Greenberg, supra note 26, at 23.
44. Greenberg, supra note 26, at 23.
45. "[Duchamp's] point was that anything in the world is art if an artist makes a decision that
it is.... Axnei Wallach, Jenny Holzer's Sign Language, NEWSDAY, Dec. 10, 1989, at 10.
46. See JANSON, supra note 22, at 681-89.
47. LucY R. LIPPARD, POP ART 9-11 (3rd ed. 1988).
48. Johns has been hailed as "perhaps the most important" pioneer of Pop Art. JANSON,
supra note 22, at 718.
49. JANSON, supra note 22, at 718.
50. LIPPARD, supra note 47, at 70.
51. JANSON, supra note 22, at 718.
52. LIPPARD, supra note 47, at 70.
53. LIPPARD, supra note 47, at 69.
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overwhelmed aesthetic concerns.' This style became known as Pop
Art," and Jasper Johns was hailed as the progenitor of the movement.5
B. Warhol and Pop Art
Once the Pop Art philosophy took hold of the art world, several
styles emerged to take advantage of the new freedom enjoyed by artists.
The most celebrated practitioner of Pop Art was Andy Warhol, who became
famous for his fetishistic portraits of Jackie Onassis, Elvis Presley, and
Marilyn Monroe.57 Early in his career, Warhol painted exact reproduc-
tions of Coca-Cola bottles and Campbell's Soup cans.5" Museum
exhibitions have been devoted to these works, and they have been cited as
a significant portion of his oeuvre.59 Warhol also used other people's
photographs in his works; sometimes they were painted over or used as part
of a collage with other items.' Occasionally, though, Warhol would
mount such a photograph largely untouched and use it as his own art.61
In 1965, Warhol exactly reproduced the second-place photograph in an
amateur photography contest.' The photographer, a "housewife,"'63
threatened legal action for copyright infringement, but Warhol settled by
giving her two original paintings."
54. JANSON, supra note 22, at 717.
55. JANSON, supra note 22, at 717.
56. "Once it was realized that the question 'Is it a flag or is it a painting?' had no
answer-was not important-the way was wide open to Pop Art." LPPARD, supra note 47, at
70.
57. See LIPPARD, supra note 47, at 70.
58. LIPPARD, supra note 47, at 70.
59. LIPPARD, supra note 47, at 92. Warhol later created a series of soup cans using many
different color schemes, thus abandoning the "natural" colors of the cans. "Warhol's early soup
cans, for which he was initially notorious, were the 'natural' red-and-white colours ....
LIPPARD, supra note 47, at 92.
60. Martin Gayford, The Arts: What's Yours is Mine, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (London), July
26, 1992, at 113.
61. Gayford, supra note 60.
62. Gayford, supra note 60.
63. Gayford, supra note 60.
64. Gayford, supra note 60. By preempting litigation, Warhol avoided the distinction of
becoming the first postmodern infringer. That position remained vacant for 25 more years, until
Jeff Koons was sued by Art Rogers. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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C. Conceptual Art
Several new styles of art and media have been incorporated into the
postmodernist arsenal during the past thirty years. Conceptual art is a form
where "the leap of imagination, not the execution, is art."" Minimalist
sculpture has been characterized by Richard Wollheim as generating
meaning "not from the artist but from a non-artistic source, like nature or
the factory."'  In each case, the materials were taken directly from the
manufacturer and altered minimally or not at all; as in all other postmodem
works, the transforming principle was that these objects were declared to
be "art."
Conceptual art may use photographs of people, places, and other
works of art as social criticism; 7 the aesthetic element of this art is
secondary to the message. Hans Haacke uses traditional artistic settings to
present a critique of contemporary society.6 Barbara Kruger has created
a series of jarring works in which purposefully trite sayings are superim-
posed over seemingly innocuous photographs.69 In a similar vein, Jenny
Holzer inscribes sayings on benches, billboards, and T-shirts, and embla-
zons them on electronic signs and scoreboards." The defining element of
65. JANsON, supra note 22, at 722.
66. KRAUSS, supra note 30, at 198. Practitioners of minimalist sculpture have included
Donald Judd and Robert Morris, who took pieces of plywood and exhibited them as sculpture,
KRAUSS, supra note 30, at 244-49, 266-67, and Dan Flavin, who cast exact replicas of other
sculptures using fluorescent light tubes. KRAUss, supra note 30, at 245.
67. See Cathy Curtis, Barbara Kruger: Snap, Crackle and Pop; Session at UC Irvine
Showcases Artist's Flashes of Wit and Social, Political Commentary, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1992,
at F25; Christopher Knight, Art; Commentary; A Monumental Burden; Chris Burden's Memorial,
Etched With the Names of Real and Made-up Vietnamese Dead Is an Unsentimental Reminder
of the War, LA. TMS, June 28, 1992, at F8; Wallach, supra note 45, at 10.
68. The Museum of Modem Art in New York hosted a Hans Haacke installation in 1970:
(A] stir was created by German expatriate artist Hans Haacke, whose contribu-
tion was a notorious site-specific piece called 'MOMA Poll.' Visitors to the
show--a survey of new Conceptual art, titled 'Information'-were invited to cast
ballots on the question: 'Would the fact that [New York] Governor [Nelson]
Rockefeller had not denounced President Nixon's Indochina policy be a reason
for you not to vote for him in November?'
Two to one, visitors answered 'yes'--even though the Rockefeller name [and
money] had been synonymous with the Manhattan museum from the start.
Knight, supra note 67 (alterations in original).
69. Examples of Kruger's work includes a photograph of Howdy Doody, on which is written,
"When I hear the word culture I take out my checkbook;" on a photograph of a little girl feeling
a boy's biceps, "We don't need another hero;" and on a photograph of a child's toy frog, "Buy
me. I'll change your life." Curtis, supra note 67.
70. Wallach, supra note 45, at 10.
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conceptual art is its use of language as a visual tool; words and phrases are
taken from their everyday context and placed into the world of visual art.
D. "Earthworks"
Conversely, some artists move their art into the natural world rather
than transferring the world into an artistic space. In 1991, the artist Christo
installed 3,100 umbrellas on hillsides in the Tejon Pass outside Los Angeles
and in a river valley in Ibarald, Japan." In the past, Christo has wrapped
islands off the coast of Florida in pink plastic 2 and erected a 25-mile
fence extending from the Pacific Ocean through Marin County in Northern
California.73 Such exhibits, termed "Earthworks,"'74 have been a common
form of artistic expression for thirty years.75 For instance, in 1970, Robert
Smithson moved his art outside;76 his "Spiral Jetty" was "a heaped runway
of basalt rock and dirt, fifteen feet wide, which corkscrews fifteen hundred
feet" into the Great Salt Lake in Utah.' Earthworks artists often use
public lands to stage their exhibitions, and the works are necessarily
transitory, since the component dirt, rocks, and trees are thereafter left to
suffer their natural fates. As in other modes of postmodern expression, the
idea of creating art from nature transcends any claim over the physical
work itself.
Extending copyright to "Earthworks" presents a unique set of
problems that has yet to be examined by any court. In Feist Publications,
Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 78 the Supreme Court reiterated the basic
principle that "copyright protection may extend only to those components
71. Christo Umbrella Crushes Woman, N.Y. TWIES, Oct. 28, 1991, at A14. Christo is Christo
Javacheff, a conceptual artist "who specializes in wrapping things... !' JANSON, supra note 22,
at 743.
72. JANSON, supra note 22, at 743.
73. Wrap Artist Christo Hopes to Cloak Reichstag, CID. TRIB., Jan. 7, 1993, at 4. Christo's
current project, pending the permission of the German government, is to wrap the Reichstag, the
German parliament building, "in a million square feet of silver-colored fabric.' Id.
74. "Earthworks" is defined as a "genre of landscape sculpture" that uses natural objects, such
as rocks and dirt, to create works of art that are blended into a natural landscape. Knight, supra
note 75.
75. See JANSON, supra note 22, at 742; Christopher Knight, Art Review; Bracing Look from
Artist's Eye; Robert Smithson's 'Photo Works' at LACMA Assembles Objects Using Photos or
Camera-Based Imagery. It's a View Firmly Fixed on Culture, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1993, at Fl.
76. KRAUSS, supra note 30, at 280-81.
77. KRAuss, supra note 30, at 281.
78. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
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of a work that are original to the author."' 9 Clearly, the dirt used by
Robert Smithson,80 that he collects from the sites on which he stages his
art, cannot be protected under any intellectual property doctrines. Christo
cannot stake an artistic claim over islands in Florida or a stretch of land in
Main County."' These elements are intrinsic to their art. Earthworks, by
definition, incorporate natural space into art. Since the Copyright Act
prohibits protection for "any idea, procedure, process.., or discovery," 2
other artists are clearly not prevented from wrapping islands elsewhere in
pink plastic or dumping dirt down hillsides in other locales.
This is not to say that Earthworks are unprotectable per se. If an
artist were to reproduce exactly Christo's ambitious project, "The Umbrel-
las," using the same land in California and Japan, several copyright issues
would be implicated. Christo placed several thousand umbrellas on these
two sites, using exclusively yellow umbrellas in California and blue
umbrellas in Japan.83 Most courts would hold that the work as a whole
can be protected, concluding that "if the selection and arrangement are
original, these elements of the work are eligible for copyright protec-
tion.""M Therefore, another artist would be precluded from staging an
exact replica of "Ihe Umbrellas." The terrain used by Christo, though
public land licensed for this use, is part of the protectable "selection and
arrangement" cited by courts in Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v.
Sarony."5 Although Christo cannot now claim that land as his personal
artistic space and prevent others from staging a sufficiently dissimilar work,
Christo can be assured that "he Umbrellas" will be the only legal work of
its kind presented in that exact manner.8 6 The protection of Christo's
79. Feist Publications, 499 U.S. at 348.
80. Robert Smithson, who produced several of the most widely known Earthworks, including
"Spiral Jetty," has been credited as one of the pioneers of this movement. Knight, supra note 75.
81. "Among (Christo's] most celebrated projects are 'Running Fence,' a 24-mile fabric curtain
erected in California in 1976, and 'Surrounded Islands,' pink polypropylene fabric around islands
in Biscayne Bay off Miami in 1983." Wrap Artist Christo Hopes to Cloak Reichstag, supra note
73. See also JANSON, supra note 22, at 743.
82. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988).
83. Christo Umbrella Crushes Woman, supra note 71.
84. Feist Publications, 499 U.S. at 349.
85. 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
86. This example was chosen because of the high-profile nature of Christo's 1991 installation.
Realistically, it is doubtful that any artist would have sufficient motivation to reproduce what has
become one of the most notorious works of art in modem history. In a driving rainstorm on Oct.
25, 1991, one of the 485-pound umbrellas toppled over onto a spectator, Lori Rae Keevil-
Mathews, fatally crushing her. A wrongful death lawsuit was brought against Christo, who
reached a settlement agreement on Sept. 3, 1992. Terms were not disclosed, but Christo's
attorney indicated that "[i]t has been settled to the satisfaction of everyone involved." David
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expression is limited, however, since "[tihe mere fact that a work is
copyrighted does not mean that every element of the work may be
protected."
' s
E. Performance Art
A similarly ambiguous area of expression is performance art, which
is one of the most prevalent and controversial forms of postmodernism.
Yves Klein is often credited as being among the first performance artists.88
In the "Anthropometries" series, Klein would dip nude female models into
blue paint and drag them over a canvas to create blotchy paintings.8 9 In
the United States, the tradition of Klein was followed by Chris Burden.
Burden once covered himself in fake blood and wedged himself under the
wheel of a car on a busy street in Los Angeles to mimic an auto acci-
dent.' This early attempt must not be judged a success, since Burden was
subsequently arrested.9 1 Burden has also had an accomplice shoot him
with a .22-caliber bullet in the arm in the name of art,' was crucified on
a Volkswagen, inserted high-tension wires into his chest and "threaten[ed]
to slit somebody's throat as a video piece . ... ""
More recently, performance art has partially merged into theater, with
more artists staging exhibitions that closely resemble one-person plays.'
Karen Finley, the most notorious of contemporary performance artists,
performs in front of standing-room only audiences in theaters in New York
and Los Angeles.95 Other artists, such as Holly Hughes, Tim Miller, and
Colker, Settlement Reached in Death at Christo Project, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1992, at BI.
87. Feist Publications, 499 U.S. at 348.
88. Theodore F. Wolff, Yves Klein and the art of blue-plus afresh look at Grandma Moses,
CHRSTiAN Sci. MoNrroa, Dec. 7, 1982, at 13.
89. See Curtis, supra note 24, at F6; Iain Gale, Art / Hands-on Experience, THE INDEPEN-
DENT, July 17, 1992, at 15. Yves Klein was a mercurial French artist who specialized in creating
controversy: "Klein's career was short but very influential .... During that period, his theories
and art pointed the way toward Minimalism and Conceptualism and influenced the development
of environmental, space-light, and body art." Wolff, supra note 88, at 13.
90. William Wilson, Chris Burden-A Daredevil's New Expressions; Realism Makes His
Works Tick... . L.A. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1988, at F93.
91. "Burden was later tried in Beverly Hills for causing a false emergency to be reported.
Charges were dismissed when a jury was unable to reach a verdict." Id.
92. Allan Jalon, Chris Burden-A Daredevil's New Expressions;. . . And Inquiry Is His
Guiding Principle, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1988, at F93.
93. Wilson, supra note 90.
94. See Jalon, supra note 92.
95. Paula Span & Carla Hall, REJECTED! Portraits of the Performers the NEA Refused to
Fund, WASH. PoST, July 8, 1990, at GI.
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John Fleck, have taken controversial aspects of homoeroticism and made
them more palatable to the conventional theatergoing public. 6 Although
performance art is gradually losing its status as a medium shunned by
traditional forms of culture, it remains a vital outlet for new artists to
explore themes that were once confined to painting and sculpture.
The growing discipline of performance art presents a complicated set
of copyright issues, since its elements are a hybrid of performance and
more traditional visual arts." Depending on the specific exhibition, works
of performance art can be classified throughout the spectrum between pure
dramatic performance and pure sculpture, both of which are protected by
the Copyright Act as "musical works, including any accompanying words;
dramatic works, including any accompanying music; [and] pantomimes and
choreographic works.""8 Some works of performance art, though, defy
conventional categorization and may not be protectable under copyright
law.
The shows presented by Yves Klein, in which an audience was
invited and a script was followed," and Karen Finley," in which
similar performances are given over a period of several nights in front of
invited audiences in a theater,"0' are protected as dramatic works, like any
other play or stage performance. In both instances, scripts are used as
signposts, and the artists "act" according to a preconceived plan. In
Finley's case, the end of the performance marks the end of the expression;
short of a videotape or a transcript, there is nothing tangible remaining
beyond the performance. Klein's shows, though, result in paintings, which
were created as part of the performance. These paintings are protectable
as "pictorial" works."°
96. 1d
97. See Allan Jalon, Losing Their Edge; Some Performance Artists Are Getting Out, Others
Seem to be Giving In, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1989, at F59A.
98. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2)-(a)(4) (1988).
99. Klein's most infamous work was his "Anthropometries" series: "In those famous studio
happenings of the late 1950s, nude women covered with blue paint served as human brushes
painting blank canvases with their bodies, to the erotic amusement of the audience." Cathy
Curtis, Art Review; Essence Proves To Be Only Skin Deep; The Work of Rachel Lachowicz an
Artist for the Age of Madonna, Is At The Newport Harbor Art Museum Through Sunday, LA.
TMES, Nov. 24, 1992, at F6.
100. Karen Finley is a well-known performance artist who was drawn into the national
spotlight by Senator Jesse Helms' attempts to abolish the National Endowment for the Arts. Span
& Hall, supra note 95.
101. Span & Hall, supra note 95.
102. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (1988).
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For Yves Klein, though, the act of creation should be protected as
well. By staging his painting process as expression in itself, 3 Klein
unwittingly created a loophole in the Copyright Act, which was not written
until more than a decade after Klein's death."° Under conventional
circumstances, "[i]n no case does copyright protection for an original work
of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of
operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which
it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.""'
When the process is part of the performance, however, a direct conflict is
generated between competing sections of the Copyright Act. Classifying
Klein's performance as either a "dramatic work" or a "choreographic work"
would give protection to an element that is clearly not copyrightable.1°6
The process itself, in this instance the creation of paintings by physically
dragging models across a canvas, is not copyrightable. Any other artist can
produce works by the same method without fear of infringement. Should
another artist wish to create these paintings under the same "performance"
conditions as Klein, copyright law ought to prevent him or her from doing
SO.
Other works of performance art in which a product is ultimately
created may not be protected because the process becomes the performance
and cannot be differentiated. Vito Acconci's "Following Piece," in which
Acconci followed people at random through the streets of New York, is a
prime example of a result-oriented performance that should not be
protected. 7 The process of following random pedestrians is not protect-
able, especially without an audience or any other way to "fix" the expres-
sion."
Acconci has also produced a series of randomly generated photo-
graphs that are created in a performance context."° As with "Following
103. See Curtis, supra note 24.
104. Klein died in 1962, at the age of 34. Wolff, supra note 88.
105. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988).
106. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988).
107. "In 1969 [Acconci] undertook a work he called Following Piece, in which he would
simply follow, unnoticed, a pedestrian he chose at random until the person disappeared behind
a closed door. 'Nobody saw it when it was done,' he says. 'I was the audience."' Michael
Small, Vito Acconci: Put Him On Exhibit, But Don't Say, 'Don't Touch', PEoPLE, Oct. 31, 1988,
at 78.
108. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988).
109. Acconci's works have included a "series of 12 [photographs] made each time he blinked
walking down a New York street," Hilliard Harper, Photo Review; 2 Ways of Viewing La Jolla
Exhibit of Monsen Collection, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1989, at F6, and "Twelve Pictures," which
were"taken while he stepped across a stage and shot the audience-including a photographer who
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Piece," the process of creation here cannot be protected. The random
nature of his movements and the non-expressive quality of Acconci's
actions might disqualify this work from any category of protected
expression.1  Acconci, however, would argue that "Following Piece"
cannot be bifurcated into a data-collection stage and a recording stage. The
work encompassed both the photographs and the act of following strangers.
Acconci would not exhibit the photographs by themselves, without an
explanation of how they were generated, because for purposes of perfor-
mance art the act of creation is the essential component of the work. In
this uncertain area there is a clear distinction between the postmodern
definition of "art'" and the Copyright Act's limited categorization of
eight protectable types of expression." 2 Since the statutory framework
makes classification of a work crucial to the rights that are reserved to the
copyright owner, it is important for the postmodern artist to know where
a work is located in the protective scheme.
In many cases, though, classification as a protectable work does not
end the copyright analysis. If the work in question infringes upon a
previously copyrighted work, copyright protection will not be extended to
the infringing work. The district court in Rogers v. Koons held that Jeff
Koons' sculpture constituted this type of infringing work. 3
F. Koons: Art as Capitalism
Another aspect of postmodern expression that has merged into
popular culture is -exemplified by Jeff Koons' work. Koons champions the
was photographing Acconci." Suzanne Muchnic, Art Review; LACMA Surveys 150 Years of
Photography, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 21, 1989, at F2.
110. Walking behind a selected person on the streets of Manhattan, without an audience or
even a plan on how exactly to follow this person, would not meet any common-law or statutory
definition of either a dramatic or a choreographed work.
111. See supra notes 17-56 and accompanying text, especially notes 38-45 and accompanying
text.
112. The statute extends protection exclusively to:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works;
(7) sound recordings; and
(8) architectural works.
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988).
113. Rogers v. Koons, 751 F. Supp. 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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financial aspects of art, and he sells his works at wildly inflated prices to
willing collectors.11 4 Part of Koons' expression is in the prices he charges
for sculptures such as a row of vacuum cleaners encased in Plexiglas or
"stainless-steel replicas of inflatable rabbits...".. Koons has also produced
exact sculptural representations of photographs he finds in museums and
gift shops. These sculptures sell for Koons' typically outrageous prices,
and thus Koons reaps significant financial rewards for his appropri-
ation."16  Koons maintains that his sculptures add "spirituality" and
"animation" to what is otherwise "only a postcard photo."".. This prac-
tice, along with every other type of appropriation in the name of post-
modem art, had gone unchecked since Andy Warhol's time. This changed
when Art Rogers discovered that his photograph, "Puppies," had been
appropriated by Jeff Koons. Rogers sued Koons for infringement,
inadvertently challenging the foundations of postmodem expression.
I1. ARTISTIC WORKS PROTECTED BY COPYRIGHT
Postmodernism, by placing the idea above the expression, collides
with both common law and statutory constructions of copyright law. The
Copyright Act of 1976 protects eight types of expression, including
photographs, paintings, sculpture, and conventional forms of theater."'
Broadened protection was given to visual works, more specifically
"pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works,""' 9 which are defined to include
"applied art, photographs, prints and reproductions"' a in either two or
three dimensions. 2'
Principles of common law have long held that photographs were
intended to be protected under the aegis of the Copyright Clause of the
114. Appleson, supra note 6. Koons' "Vacuum Cleaner," purchased for $1,200 in 1980, is
now estimated to be worth $150,000. Dalya Allberge, Contemporary Art Market: Enthusiasts
in the Grip of a Grand Passion, T-E IDEPENDENT, Dec. 30, 1991, at 4. In 1991, a Koons
collection of vacuum cleaners sold for $137,500 at a Sotheby's auction in New York. Judd Tully,
Sotheby's Respectable Showing, WASH. POST, May 1, 1991, at B1.
115. Hays, supra note 5, at B2.
116. Hays, supra note 5.
117. Sullivan, supra note 1, at B3.
118. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988).
119. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (1988).
120. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
121. The full definition is as follows: "'Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works' include two-
dimensional and three-dimensional works of fine, graphic, and applied art, photographs, prints and
art reproductions, maps, globes, charts, diagrams, models, and technical drawings, including
architectural plans." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
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United States Constitution. Congress is expressly authorized to "promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries. . . ."22 In Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony,'
the Supreme Court broadened the constitutional definition of "authorship"
by stating that "(ain author in that sense is 'he to whom anything owes its
origin; originator; maker .... ,,124 The Court concluded that the act of
photography incorporated enough expressive elements to qualify for
copyright protection: "We entertain no doubt that the Constitution is broad
enough to cover an act authorizing copyright of photographs, so far as they
are representatives of original intellectual conceptions of the author.""
The Court introduced a comprehensive list of expressive choices made by
the author in producing a protectable photograph. The factors include
"posing .... selecting and arranging the costume, draperies, and other
various accessories ... .arranging the subject... [and] arranging and
disposing the light and shade . . . ." 6 The Burrow-Giles test is still
often cited as the source of protection for photographs: V "The originali-
ty requirement articulated in... Burrow-Giles remains the touchstone of
copyright protection today."'
Conventional forms of sculpture fit readily into the statutory
framework of the Copyright Act of 1976, but some ambiguity arises when
the sculpture contains objects that have uses outside of an artistic context.
No problems are presented in protecting traditional bronze or plaster cast
sculpture of people or animals, since the work originates completely from
the sculptor. Copyright protection, however, does not extend to "mechani-
cal or utilitarian aspects" of a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work. 9
Under the "useful article"13 exception, objects like soup cans or pop
bottles, as depicted in Andy Warhol's paintings,' are not protectable
elements of a visual work. The useful article exception prevents anyone,
122. U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 8.
123. 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
124. Id. at 57-58.
125. Md at 58.
126. Id4 at 60.
127. See, e.g., Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 306 (2d Cir. 1992); Feist Publications, Inc.
v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 347 (1991).
128. Feist Publications, 499 US. at 347.
129. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
130. "A 'useful article' is an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely
to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information. An article that is normally a
part of a useful article is considered a 'useful article."' 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
131. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
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including the manufacturer, from claiming a copyright to the basic design
of a can or bottle."' This policy seeks to prevent monopolies in objects
that have extensive commercial value.
For example, the basic design of an upright vacuum cleaner does not
qualify for copyright protection. If the design met the statutory definition
of a sculptural work, the first manufacturer of such a vacuum could
maintain a commercial monopoly over a household appliance. On the other
hand, a photograph of a vacuum cleaner which meets the Burrow-Giles test
can be copyrighted, since a photograph does not have an inherent utilitarian
function.133 Moreover, a work that contains a useful article can be
protected in limited circumstances:
mhe design of a useful article, as defined in this section, shall
be considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if,
and only to the extent that, such design incorporates pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately
from, and are capable of existing independently of, the
utilitarian aspects of the article."3
IV. THE REACH OF ROGERS V. KOONS
A. Statement of Facts
In 1980, photographer Art Rogers snapped a portrait of a friend's
litter of eight German Shepherd puppies. 3  The resulting photograph,
"Puppies," which included the owners of the puppies seated on a bench,
was published in a local newspaper and was exhibited for a short time at
the San Francisco Museum of Modem Art.136 In 1984, Rogers licensed
the reproduction rights for "Puppies" to a company that produces notecards
and postcards. 137 Rogers reserved his right to use the photograph, which
he later exercised by including "Puppies" in an anthology of canine
photography.
3 8
132. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988).
133. This is not to say that another photographer is barred from executing a photo of the same
vacuum cleaner. Only the expression inherent in the first photograph is protected, not the idea
of taking a picture of a vacuum cleaner. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988); supra notes 86-87 and
accompanying text.
134. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
135. Rogers v. Koons, 751 F. Supp. 474, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
136. I
137. Id.
138. Id.
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Sometime in early 1988, sculptor Jeff Koons purchased at least one
"Puppies" notecard. '3 The card contained a notice of copyright in
Rogers' name, but Koons removed the notice and sent the notecard to a
studio in Italy."4 Koons commissioned the studio to create a sculpture
using the photograph, with explicit instructions for the work to "be just like
[the] photo."'
141
At the end of 1987 or in 1988 Koons purchased at least two
Museum Graphics notecards displaying Rogers' "Puppies"
photograph .... Koons decided to use the photograph for one
of the sculptures to be exhibited in the Banality Show. He
tore off that portion of the notecard showing the copyright
notice and sent the photograph to the Demetz Arts Studio in
Italy, with instructions to make a polychromed wood sculptur-
al version of the photograph, a work that Koons instructed
Demetz "must be just like photo." Koons continued to
communicate with Demetz, reiterating that the features of the
humans and the puppies be reproduced "as per photo." As to
the painting of the sculpture, Koons gave Demetz a chart with
an enlarged photocopy of "Puppies" in the center, and on
which he noted painting directions in the margin with arrows
drawn to various areas of the photograph. Koons instructed
Demetz to paint the puppies in shades of "blue," with "varia-
tion of light-to-dark as per photo." The man's hair was to be
"white with shades of grey as per black and white photo."'
42
Four sculptures were eventually created for Koons, and after making
corrections to conform them more closely to the photograph, Koons
christened them "String of Puppies."'
143
The Sonnabend Gallery in New York, which has long been Koons'
agent, sold three of the sculptures to collectors for a combined
$367,000."4 The fourth sculpture was retained by Koons. Rogers first
learned of the existence of Koons' sculptures when he saw "String of
Puppies" pictured in the Los Angeles Times.'45 Rogers sued for copyright
infringement, and an injunction was granted which prevented Koons from
139. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 305 (2d Cir. 1992).
140. Id
141. Id at 305.
142. Rogers v. Koons, 751 F. Supp. at 476 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
143. Id
144. Id
145. See William Wilson, Comments on Our Life and Tunes; Polite Agit-Pop Exhibit in 'A
Forest of Signs,' L.A. TIMES, May 7, 1989, at F6.
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exploiting his own sculptures.' The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affirmed,' 47 and the United States Supreme Court denied a writ
of certiorari on the issue of fair use.'8
B. Derivative Works
The initial inquiry in the district court's analysis was to determine
whether Koons' work was a derivative work of Rogers' photograph. A
"derivative work" is defined as "a work based upon one or more preexist-
ing works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization,
fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction,
abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be
recast, transformed, or adapted."' 49 The holder of a copyright can control
the extent to which the protected work serves as the source for a closely
associated work by asserting the exclusive right "to prepare derivative
works based upon the copyrighted work."" 0
The district court noted that a sculpture can be a derivative work of
a photograph.' "Under the plain wording of the statute, Koons' sculpture
is a derivative work based upon Rogers' photograph; and Rogers as
copyright owner had the exclusive right to authorize [a] derivative
work."'' Koons attempted to circumvent the derivative work prohibition
by arguing that protection for a photograph extends only to other photo-
graphs. The court, however, was unmoved: "In copyright law the medium
is not the message, and a change in medium does not preclude infringe-
ment."' 53
Case law has consistently held over the last century that a work in
one medium can be a derivative work from an original in a different
medium. In Falk v. T.P. Howell & Co., 5' infringement was found when
a chair manufacturer stamped a raised copy of a pre-existing photograph on
the backs of its chairs. The court held that "[d]ifferences which relate
merely to size and material are not important."' 55 In King Features
146. Rogers v. Koons, 751 F. Supp. at 475-76.
147. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d at 314.
148. Koons v. Rogers, 113 S. CL 365 (1992).
149. ld.
150. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1988).
151. Rogers v. Koons, 751 F. Supp. 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
152. d at 477.
153. Id.
154. 36 F. 202 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1888).
155. Id.
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Syndicate v. Fleischer,56 a cartoon character was copied for use as a toy
doll. The court offered the following policy rationale for denying
defendant's different medium argument:
We do not think it avoids the infringement of the copyright to
take the substance or idea, and produce it through a different
medium, and picturing in shape and details in sufficient
imitation to make it a true copy of the character thought of by
the appellant's employee. Doing this is omitting the work of
the artisan, but appropriating the genius of the artist .... A
piece of statuary may be infringed by the picture of the
statuary for the Copyright Act secured to the author the
original and natural rights, and it is the intendment [sic] of the
law of copyrights that they shall have a liberal construction in
order to give effect to what may be considered as an inherent
right of the author in his work.' 7
The district court thus held that if a sculpture can be infringed by a
photograph, a photograph can be infringed by a sculpture that is derived
from it. The district court concluded that "[tihe fact that a work in one
medium has been copied from a work in another medium does not render
it any less a 'copy."'" 8
This holding may severely restrict the potential subject matter of
postmodern artists. Artists like Jeff Koons will no longer be able to
appropriate photographs and transform them. Sherrie Levine, who has built
a career out of "re-photographed famous photographs and redrawn Matisse
drawings,"' 9 will be exposed to liability for infringement for her entire
oeuvre, since virtually every work she has created is a derivative work
under the Rogers definition."W For owners of preexisting works, Rogers
is a powerful piece of ammunition in protecting their rights. By affirming
that the different medium argument is still invalid today, the Rogers court
156. 299 F. 533 (2d Cir. 1924).
157. Id. at 535-36.
158. Rogers v. Koons, 751 F. Supp. at 478 (quoting I MELvlI.E NIMMER & DAVID NIMME,
NIMMER ON CoPYiIoG § 2.08(E) at 2-123 to 2-124 (1989)).
159. Dannat, supra note 4.
160. Artists such as Levine must still be concerned about copyrights for deceased artists, since
copyrights are transferred, along with other property rights, according to laws of succession. For
example, Henri Matisse died in 1954. Under the Copyright Act of 1909, which was in effect at
the time Matisse's works were created, the artist is entitled to a copyright which can extend for
75 years after creation. These rights transferred to Matisse's heirs upon his death. Therefore, at
the time this Article is published, there may still be a valid copyright on any Matisse work created
after 1919.
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has said that a photographer such as Art Rogers can protect his expression
from being copied in any medium. The pose that Rogers selected for his
eight puppies and two humans is protected throughout the entire range of
artistic media. As long as the copyright endures, 1" the arrangement of
the subject matter of "Puppies" is the exclusive property of the copyright
owner.
C. Infringement
The district court next employed the Second Circuit's test for
copyright infringement. When any of a copyright owner's exclusive rights
are violated, an action for infringement can be brought.162 Although the
wording used by courts differs considerably,' 63 the essential elements can
be identified as "(1) derivation (i.e., that defendant's work was copied from
plaintiff's); and (2) excessive appropriation of protectable material (i.e.,
substantial similarity)."'" Before a plaintiff can reach the elements of
infringement, it must be shown that the portions of the work allegedly
infringed were protected under the Copyright Act.
1. Validity of Copyright
The ownership of a copyright is a question of fact that begins with
the evidentiary presumption that "[in any judicial proceedings the
certificate of a registration... shall constitute prima facie evidence of the
validity of the copyright and of the facts stated in the certificate."'"
Registration of a copyright with the United States Copyright Office is not
a prerequisite for copyright protection.1" In order to institute an action
161. The Copyright Act of 1976 provides: "Copyright in a work created on or after January
1, 1978, subsists from its creation and... endures for a term consisting of the life of the author
and fifty years after the author's death." 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1988).
162. "Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner .. is an
infringer of the copyright." 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1988).
163. Compare Weissman v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 1313, 1320 (2d Cir. 1989) ("To establish a
claim of copyright infringement, plaintiff must prove ownership of a valid copyright and copying
by the defendant.") with Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prod. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d
1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 1977) ("[I]nftingement would be established upon proof of ownership,
access, and substantial similarity.').
164. LIONEL SOBEL, MATERIALS ON AMERICAN AND INTERNATONAL COPYRIGHT LAW 8.2.1
(1992) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Journal).
165. 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (1988).
166. 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (1988).
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for infringement, however, a copyright must be registered with the
Copyright Office. 67
As the Second Circuit noted in Rogers v. Koons, the presumption of
ownership may be rebutted6 ' to overcome prima facie evidence of
validity of copyright. 69 The registration requirement is a vestige of
common law notice requirements, which invalidated the copyright for any
work that failed to include a copyright notice.7 The central purpose of
registration today is to identify the owner of the allegedly infringed work.
In cases where ownership of the copyright is disputed, registration can
serve as a powerful tool to assert one's rights.
In postmodem works of art, however, ownership is rarely a disputed
issue. "Found objects" commonly are not defaced or altered so as to
obscure their origins; to do so would be to defeat the referential purpose of
using appropriated items. Jeff Koons did not deny to the trial court that the
photograph he used was taken by Art Rogers. Since Koons' main defense
is one of fair use because his sculptures have parody value,' 7' he could
not claim ownership of the photograph. The other requirements for a valid
copyright were contested by Koons, though, and the opinions in the Rogers
line are illustrative of the convincing case that can be asserted against a
postmodern artist.
2. Originality
To qualify for copyright protection, a work, regardless of classifica-
tion, must satisfy two general statutory requirements: "Copyright protection
167. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (1988). Registration is not required under any circumstances for
works protected under the auspices of the Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works [the Berne Convention]. This includes any non-United States work whose country of origin
is a member of the Berne Convention. The effect of international copyright law on postmodem
art is beyond the scope of this Article, which focuses only on the laws of the United States. Since
Berne Convention works are protected in the United States under the Copyright Act, though, it
is possible for much of this analysis to be applied to works of international artists. Id.
168. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 306 (2d Cir. 1992).
169. This presumption is a form of judicial bootstrapping that weighs heavily in favor of the
plaintiff in copyright cases. Since registration of a work with the U.S. Copyright Office is
required prior to filing an infringement action by 17 U.S.C. § 411(a), every plaintiff will enjoy
the benefits of this presumption. The purpose behind this practice is to shift the burden of proof
to the defendant to show that the allegedly infringed work was not copyrightable.
170. Works published before Jan. 1, 1978, when the current Copyright Act went into effect,
were subject to § 10 of the 1909 Act, which required that copyright be secured by notice of
copyright, "affixed to each copy thereof published." A work published without notice irrevocably
entered the public domain.
171. See infra notes 229-39 and accompanying text.
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subsists... in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium
of expression . *...,, For purposes of copyright analysis, the Act
requires that a work be sufficiently original, and fixed in a tangible form.
Despite the level of effort or talent apparent in an artistic work, if it does
not meet the current definition of originality, it cannot be protected by a
copyright. The common law interpretation of the originality requirement,
though, allows maximum latitude to the creator of the work.
The Second Circuit began its infringement analysis in Rogers by
noting that "the cornerstone of [copyright] law is that the work protected
must be original."' 173 Only a "modest" showing of originality, however,
will satisfy the requirement. 4 The Feist Court noted that "[o]riginal, as
the term is used in copyright, means only that the work was independently
created by the author (as opposed to copied from other works), and that it
possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity."'"
Originality does not mean "novelty"'" 6 or even a spark of creative
inspiration. In general, a work will be found to be original if an author
"contributed something more than a 'merely trivial' variation, something
recognizably 'his own.""'
In most cases, a court does not have to rely on generalized statutory
interpretations to reach a finding of originality. The district court ruled as
a matter of law that the underlying photograph fulfilled the originality
requirement: "It is well settled that a photographer's originality in
photographic expression is entitled to full copyright protection."'7 The
court of appeals agreed:
Rogers' inventive efforts in posing the group for the photo-
graph, taking the picture, and printing 'Puppies' suffices to
meet the original work of art criteria. Thus, in terms of his
unique expression of the subject matter captured in the
172. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988).
173. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 307 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing Feist Publications v. Rural
Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991)).
174. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d at 307.
175. Feist Publications, 499 U.S. at 345 (citing 1 NIMER & NMMER, supra note 158, at
2.01 [A], [B] (1990)).
176. See Feist Publications, 499 U.S. at 345-46.
177. L. Batlin & Sons, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir. 1976) (citing Alfred Bell
& Co. v. Catalsa Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 103 (1951)).
178. Rogers v. Koons, 751 F. Supp. 474, 477 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). See also Burrow-Giles
Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53,55 (1884); supra notes 118-134 and accompanying text.
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photograph, plaintiff has established valid ownership of a
copyright in an original work of art.'7
Under this standard, almost any photograph can be copyrighted. It
does not matter whether the photographer is a professional or an amateur,
since any photographer necessarily makes the artistic choices listed in
Burrow-Giles and reiterated in Rogers. Therefore, postmodern artists need
to be aware that appropriated photographs carry with them sufficient
originality to warrant protection. Use of another's photograph in an
installation or a multi-media work does not negate originality in the
underlying work. Since pure artistic merit is not an element of originality,
there is no hierarchy that can be asserted to deny originality. Koons, in
attempting to circumvent the court's reasoning, complained that "[i]t was
only a postcard photo and I gave it spirituality, animation and took it to
another vocabulary." 80 In the eyes of the Second Circuit, focused by one
hundred years of common law, this argument was without merit.
3. Copying
Once a court establishes that a valid copyright exists in the allegedly
infringed work, the next line of analysis seeks to determine whether the
defendant copied enough of the plaintiff s work to justify a finding of
infringement.' Where the underlying work is a photograph that has
been directly appropriated by an artist, the presumption of infringement is
quite strong. Furthermore, courts construe copying to include more than
identical reproduction of the underlying work; assertion of a "change in
medium" defense is not persuasive. The district court noted that "[i]n
copyright law the medium is not the message, and a change in medium
179. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d at 307.
180. Sullivan, supra note 1.
181. Unfortunately, neither courts nor legal scholars have been able to create a test for
infringement that satisfies the semantic and logical concerns of all parties. The analytical pathway
followed in this Article parallels the examination performed by the Second Circuit, primarily
because future postmodern art infringement cases will rely heavily on that opinion. The test
found at supra note 164 and accompanying text divides infringement into categories of "access"
and "substantial similarity." The Second Circuit has blended both elements together, and has
rendered impossible the dissection of the court's reasoning into discrete portions. Normally, the
result in infringement cases does not widely vary from test to test, so this dispute does not inhibit
understanding of how postmodern artists may infringe copyrights. It should be noted, however,
that the plethora of tests throughout the circuits and intellectual property treatises will not be
recognized in this Article to avoid confusion and preserve the issue for treatment by another eager
copyright scholar.
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does not preclude infringement."1  This rule derives from Falk v. T.P.
Howell & Co.,"8 s in which a chair manufacturer infringed a photograph
by-stamping "a raised figure, like the picture, on the leather of which the
bottoms and backs of chairs are made.""' The crucial language, relied
upon in Rogers,"s states:
The only question is, do the defendants infringe? That their
design is copied directly from the copyrighted photograph is
not denied, but it is urged that infringement is avoided,
because it is larger than the photograph, and is stamped on
leather, and is intended for the bottom or back of a chair. It
is thought that this proposition cannot be maintained. Differ-
ences which relate merely to size and material are not impor-
tant.
186
Therefore, there is no legal significance to the transformation of a
photograph into a sculpture. Since copyright laws are intended to protect
the expression of the creator, it is immaterial what medium is used to
convey the message.' The district court admonished this attempt to
distinguish the works: "Doing this is omitting the work of the artisan, but
appropriating the genius of the artist." '188 The court concluded that
Koons' sculpture constituted an unauthorized derivative work that violated
Rogers' copyright."8 9
The most commonly used construction for a finding of infringement
is "substantial similarity." The difficulties encountered in applying this
standard were articulated by Judge Learned Hand in Nichols v. Universal
Pictures Corp.:190
But when the plagiarist does not take out a block in situ, but
an abstract of the whole, decision is more troublesome....
The last may perhaps be no more than the most general
statement of what the play is about, and at times might consist
only of its title; but there is a point in this series of abstrac-
tions where they are no longer protected, since otherwise the
182. Rogers v. Koons, 751 F. Supp. 474, 477 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
183. 37 F. 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1888).
184. Md
185. Rogers v. Koons, 751 F. Supp. at 477.
186. Falk, 37 F. 202.
187. See I NimER & NIMR, supra note 158, at 2.08[E].
188. Rogers v. Koons, 751 F. Supp. at 478 (citing King Features Syndicate v. Fleisher, 299
F. 533, 535 (2d Cir. 1924)).
189. Rogers v. Koons, 751 F. Supp. at 477.
190. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).
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playwright could prevent the use of his 'ideas,' to which, apart
from their expression, his property is never extended. 91
One standard test of substantial similarity, the modem derivation of Judge
Hand's abstractions test, is "whether an average lay observer would
recognize the alleged copy as having been appropriated from the copyright-
ed work."'" Koons advanced the discredited "substitute medium"
argument in an attempt to preclude a finding of substantial similarity.'93
The trial court rejected it in favor of the lay observer test, holding that no
lay observer could disagree: 'There is no question.., that 'an average lay
observer' would recognize the sculpture... as 'having been appropriated
from' the photograph .... ."" The Second Circuit agreed with the lower
court, pointing out that Koons not only intended to make an exact copy of
the photograph but that he instructed his artisans to make corrections in
favor of the original: "His instructions invariably implored that the creation
must be designed 'as per photo.
' "9 95
Although the result of Rogers is compatible with a standard
infringement analysis, the court followed a tortured course in determining
that sufficient copying existed. In the district court, Rogers asserted that
substantial similarity does not need to be addressed when direct evidence
of copying is available.'" The facts, as contained in the trial court's
opinion, unequivocally show that direct copying occurred. 97  Yet the
court chose to ignore this line of analysis, reasoning that the direct copying
rule was not properly derived from a Second Circuit case, Durham Indus.,
191. lId at 121 (citing Holmes v. Hurts, 174 U.S. 82, 86 (1899)).
192. Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu Ltd., 360 F.2d 1021, 1022 (2d Cir. 1966).
193. Rogers v. Koons, 751 F. Supp. at 478.
194. Id.
195. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 307 (2d Cir. 1992).
196. See Illinois Bell Tel. v. Haines & Co., Inc., 905 F.2d 1081, 1086 (7th Cir. 1990) ("To
satisfy the copying element of infringement, direct evidence of copying will suffice. Establishing
substantial similarity is necessary only when direct evidence of copying is unavailable.") (citation
oritted), vacated and remanded sub. nom. Haines and Co., Inc. v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 499 U.S.
944 (1991), after the Supreme Court's decision in Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499
U.S. 340 (1991).
197. Rogers v. Koons, 751 F. Supp. at 476.
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Inc. v. Tomy Corp.9 ' Instead, the court followed the lay observer test
that was present in Durham Indus.'99
The court of appeals, though it also focused on substantial similarity,
detailed the evidence of direct copying.' The substantial similarity
analysis is little more than dicta, since the court agreed, solely on the
evidence of direct copying, that "no reasonable juror could find that
copying did not occur in this case."' Substantial similarity is reached
by noting that "even were such direct evidence of copying is unavailable,
the district court's decision could be upheld . . . ."2 By applying the
substantial similarity test, both courts expanded the reach of their holdings
to include less blatant forms of appropriation. This may permit future
defendants to successfully limit these holdings to circumstances where
evidence of direct copying is available.
The application of the substantial similarity test also allowed Koons
to challenge the validity of the lay observer test. Koons argued that trial
judges are not competent to reach a decision on artistic issues. The court
summarily rejected that argument, holding that "the decision-maker,
whether it be a judge or a jury, need not have any special skills other than
to be a reasonable and average lay person."' 2 3 Questions of artistic merit
have never been a part of copyright law. Originality is determined without
regard to aesthetic tastes, and a finding of infringement does not turn on
any perceived artistic differences in the copyrighted works. Therefore,
although the message behind much of Jeff Koons' appropriations is that the
"found object" has been uplifted into a higher state of artistic quality,204
this argument carries no weight as a matter of law.
Koons also mounted a more traditional challenge to the finding of
substantial similarity by showing that there were obvious points of
dissimilarity between his sculpture and the photograph.' s  It has long
198. 630 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1980). See Rural Tel. Serv. Co. v. Feist Publications, Inc., 663
F. Supp. 214, 218 (D. Kan. 1987). In Rogers, the plaintiff relied on Feist, which cites Durham,
630 F.2d at 911-12, as a source for the direct copying exception. The district court in Rogers was
unable to locate any support for this proposition in the Durham opinion. In fact, no such support
exists in that case.
199. Durham Indus., 630 F.2d at 911-12.
200. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d at 305-07.
201. Id. at 307.
202. I&
203. 1,d at 308.
204. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
205. Although this analysis may be useful to future litigants, it must be emphasized that the
finding of substantial similarity was unnecessary to the affirmation of the district court's
judgment.
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been held, though, that "no plagiarist can excuse the wrong by showing
how much of his work he did not pirate."2't The only circumstance in
which dissimilarity can preclude infringement is where the similar points
are "of small import quantitatively or qualitatively .... ,207 Once again
noting the direct evidence of copying, the court concluded that "[tihis is
not the case here. Koons' additions... are insufficient to raise a genuine
issue of material fact with regard to copying. ....208
Since the finding of copying was beyond doubt, the district court
granted summary judgment in favor of Rogers.' In cases hinging on
substantial similarity, summary judgment is appropriate when the "similari-
ties are so obvious that there can be no genuine issue of fact that defen-
dant's design was copied from plaintiffs'. In short, the similarities are so
great that an ordinary observer would easily detect them."'21 If reason-
able minds can differ on a finding of substantial similarity, summary
judgment is inappropriate. 21 ' The court of appeals upheld the summary
judgment, holding that "[n]o genuine issue of material fact exists ... .,'22
Thus, Jeff Koons found himself facially liable for infringement of Art
Rogers' photograph.
There is an affirmative defense to infringement, however. Koons
attempted to assert that his sculptures were a "fair use" of "Puppies." If
successful, this would provide Koons with a complete defense from liability
to Rogers.
D. Fair Use
The doctrine of fair use carves out an exception in an author's bundle
of rights. Originally a common law principle that evolved through the
courts, fair use was codified in the Copyright Act of 1976.213 The factors
weighed in a fair use analysis are: (1) the purpose and character of the use;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of
206. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp.. 81 F.2d 49. 56 (2d Cir. 1936).
207. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d at 308.
208. Id.
209. Rogers v. Koons, 751 F. Supp. at 481.
210. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Dan River Mills, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 1366, 1369 (S.D.N.Y.
1969).
211. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d at 307. See Twentieth-Century Fox Film Corp. v. MCA, Inc.,
715 F.2d 1327, 1328 (9th Cir. 1983) ("Only if no genuine issue of material fact exists will the
moving party be entitled to prevail as a matter of law.").
212. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d at 308.
213. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988).
19941
308 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14
the portion used; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for
or value of the copyrighted work.214 If a work is found to be a fair use
of a copyrighted work, there is no infringement. Although the Supreme
Court refused to hear Jeff Koons' fair use arguments, contemporary artists
may still consider fair use to be an effective tool to avoid infringement by
appropriation.
1. Purpose and Character of Use
a. Commercial Nature
The first factor "asks whether the original was copied in good faith
to benefit the public or primarily for the commercial interests of the
infringer."2 5 The Supreme Court has held that use of a copyrighted work
for profit purposes is presumptively unfair.2" 6 Therefore, any use of a
protected work that has a distinct commercial purpose is labeled unfair per
se. The Court, attempting to lighten this heavy burden, has explained that
"[tihe crux of the profit/nonprofit distinction is not whether the sole motive
of the use is monetary gain but whether the user stands to profit from
exploitation of the copyrighted material without paying the customary
price."2  By extension, the existence of a licensing scheme whereby the
owner of the underlying work could profit from the derivative work might
weigh in favor of fair use.
The facts of Rogers indicate that Jeff Koons made no attempt to
contact Art Rogers or negotiate any distribution of profits to the photogra-
pher. From the facts contained in the opinion, it is clear that Koons
intended to share neither the credit for nor the profit from his sculp-
tures.218 Koons sold three copies of his sculpture, "String of Puppies,"
for a total of $367,000.2"9 The Second Circuit noted at the outset of its
opinion that Koons' sculptures "bettered the price of the copied work by a
thousand to one."' Since Koons gained a "substantial profit from his
214. I,
215. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 309 (2d Cir. 1992).
216. See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449 (1984).
217. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985).
218. After purchasing the notecard containing Rogers' photograph, "[Koons] tore off that
portion showing Rogers' copyright of 'Puppies."' Rogers, 960 F.2d at 305.
219. Id
220. 1& at 303.
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intentionally exploitive use," the court of appeals found that the first factor
presumptively militates against fair use22'
Koons, however, challenged the validity of this presumption in his
writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. Koons presented the Court with
the question: "[d]oes [a] work of art that would otherwise qualify for
copyright defense of 'fair use' become [a] form of actionable commercial
exploitation simply because its creator was paid for that work?"'' The
district court had already disposed of that question, though, noting that
"notwithstanding its unquestioned status as a work of art, the sculpture is
not unsullied by considerations of commerce."'' The district court also
laid out a description of Koons' marketing techniques, emphasizing that
Koons "actively markets his sculptures"' 4 among other commercially
motivated activities. No authority exists to contradict the assertion that
commercial use of a work is a valid factor to be considered in fair use. To
accept Koons' petition would be to question the plain language of the
Copyright Act.' The Supreme Court denied certiorari.226
Koons' argument holds more weight when considered in the limited
context of the contemporary art market. With the possible exception of
outsider artists,' all contemporary artists use some commercial avenue
in displaying their work. Artists must sell their work if they wish to make
a living from their talents. It is disingenuous at best for a court to assume
that works of art can be created without any commercial intent. Despite the
art world's attempt to consider only aesthetics, the bare reality is that
working artists must depend on the patronage of collectors and galleries to
continue to produce art. Jeff Koons was castigated because he seemed to
champion the commercial aspects of his art. Koons, to his detriment,
221. Id. at 309.
222. Koons v. Rogers, cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 365 (1992).
223. Rogers v. Koons, 751 F. Supp. 474, 479 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
224. lId
225. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1) defines the first factor as "the purpose and character of the use,
including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes"
(emphasis added).
226. Koons v. Rogers, cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 365 (1992).
227. Outsider artists are traditionally defined as artists without formal training or a relationship
with the conventional art community. In fact, some of these artists have enjoyed considerable
commercial and critical success. The Los Angeles County Museum of Art mounted a major
exhibition of these artists in the winter of 1992 and published a companion catalog that was sold
in the museum gift shop. Christopher Knight, Art Review; Shortsighted 'Visions'; A Major
Presentation at LACMA Stumbles While Tracking the Influence on Modern Art of Obsessive,
Visionary Pictures Made by Untutored Laymen, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1992, at Fl.
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readily admitted his fascination with the profit element of contemporary
art."n In this context, the Rogers decisions can be seen more as a
condemnation of Jeff Koons' philosophy than a blanket rejection of non-
commercial art. Since Rogers was a case of first impression in the context
of contemporary art, it remains to be seen if all works of appropriation are
treated as purely commercial creatures for fair use purposes.
b. Parody and Criticism
A specialized body of analysis has developed for the determination
of fair use in particular circumstances. Under the first factor, the use of a
copyrighted work for parody or social criticism has often been determi-
native of fair use. The preamble to the fair use section of the Copyright
Act states that purposes such as criticism or comment may be a valid use
of a work. 9 The language of the statute indicates, however, that all four
fair use factors must still be considered.?0 Courts have placed consider-
ation of parody and criticism into a broadened fair use context: "a parody
entitles its creator under the fair use doctrine to more extensive use of the
copied work than is ordinarily allowed under the substantial similarity
test."'" The rationale behind the protection of parody is found in Warner
Bros., Inc. v. ABC-7
32
The "parody" branch of the "fair use" doctrine is itself a
means of fostering the creativity protected by the copyright
law. It also balances the public interest in the free flow of
ideas with the copyright holder's interest in the exclusive use
of his work. Especially in an era of mass communications, it
is to be expected that phrases and other fragments of expres-
sion in a highly successful copyrighted work will become part
of the language. 3
The Second Circuit created an innovative definition of parody that
is applicable to all forms of contemporary art. "Parody or satire, as we
understand it, is when one artist, for comic effect or social commentary,
closely imitates the style of another artist and in so doing creates a new art
228. "[Koons] has trumpeted his contempt for artists who eschewed the 'real world' of
money, power and mass media." Gayford, supra note 60.
229. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988).
230. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988).
231. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310 (2d Cir. 1992).
232. 720 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1983).
233. Id at 242.
COPYRIGHT AND CONTEMPORARY ART
work that makes ridiculous the style and expression of the original."'
A gloss on this definition, though, transformed the rule into an unworkable
prohibition on postmodern expression. While noting that a work may
satirize modem society in general, the court of appeals held that "the copied
work must be, at least in part, an object of the parody .... ," The court
reasoned:
We think this is a necessary rule, as were it otherwise there
would be no real limitation on the copier's use of another's
copyrighted work to make a statement on some aspect of
society at large.... The rule's function is to ensure that credit
is given where credit is due.... [W]e merely insist that the
audience be aware that underlying the parody there is an
original and separate expression, attributable to a different
artist.
" 6
Jeff Koons' main contention in his fair use defense was that "String
of Puppies" was a satire or parody of society. 3 Drawing on the tradition
of Duchamp and Warhol, Koons argued that his style of art "proposes
through incorporating these images into works of art to comment critically
both on the incorporated object and the political and economic system that
created it.""38 The court accepted this definition of Koons' style but
refused to credit it as a parody, holding that "it is difficult to discern any
parody of the photograph 'Puppies' itself."'239 Therefore, "String of
Puppies" was not a parody of the uiderlying photograph for purposes of
fair use.
2. Nature of Work
The second factor of the fair use doctrine examines the nature of the
underlying copyrighted work. The Second Circuit interpreted this factor to
mean that "the scope of fair use is greater with respect to factual than non-
factual works."24  The Second Circuit defined the test as "[wihether the
original is creative, imaginative, or represents an investment of time in
234. Rogers, 960 F.2d at 309-10.
235. Id. at 310. See MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 185 (2d Cir. 1981) ("[If the
copyrighted song is not at least in part an object of the parody, there is no need to conjure it
up.").
236. Rogers, 960 F.2d at 310.
237. Id. at 309.
238. Id.
239. Id at 310.
240. New Era Publications Int'l v. Carol Publishing Group, 904 F.2d 152,157 (2d Cir. 1990).
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anticipation of a financial return .... " Under this test, any work of
art "published"'24 2 in the copyright sense is considered creative and
imaginative. For the Rogers court, it was determinative that Rogers was a
professional photographer who hoped to gain a financial return for
"Puppies."4 3 Any photograph appropriated for a postmodern work would
be considered creative under this factor. Only when an artist appropriates
factual material such as "biographies and telephone directories" 244 can the
nature of the underlying work weigh in favor of fair use.
3. Amount Copied
Even though the amount of the underlying work that has been copied
is a factor used in a finding of infringement, it is also a statutory factor in
the fair use defense. Courts have noted this redundancy but seem
comfortable in repeating the analysis. 5 The general test does not present
a bright-line rule, as noted in Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell:2 6  "In
some instances, copying a work wholesale has been held to be fair use,
while in other cases taling only a tiny portion of the original work has
been held unfair." 247 The Rogers court reformulated the test to rely on
the qualitative degree of copying by measuring "what degree of the essence
of the original is copied in relation to its whole."2"
In Rogers, Jeff Koons' arguments were not considered in relation to
the qualitative degree of copying. Bluntly noting that "Koons appropriated
the entire photograph," '249 the district court devoted no more space to this
factor. The court of appeals, though, considered another aspect of Koons'
241. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677
F.2d 180, 182 (2d Cir. 1981)).
242. The Copyright Act states:
"Publication" is the distribution of copies or phonorecords of a work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending. The
offering to distribute copies or phonorecords to a group of person for purposes
of further distribution, public performance, or public display, constitutes
publication. A public performance or display of a work does not of itself
constitute publication.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
243. Rogers, 960 F.2d at 310.
244. Id
245. "To a large degree, this factor involves the same analysis as that used when determining
if the copy is substantially similar to the original." Id at 311.
246. 803 F.2d 1253 (2d Cir. 1986).
247. Id at 1263 (citations omitted).
248. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 311 (2d Cir. 1992).
249. Rogers v. Koons, 751 F. Supp. 474, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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parody defense. If a work satisfies the copyright definition of a parody,
"[the Second] Circuit has traditionally afforded parodists significant leeway
with respect to the extent and nature of their copying." This was not
an issue to be decided by the Rogers court, though, since they had already
determined that "'String of Puppies' is not a parody of Rogers' work."' ' 1
Therefore, such a claim is not foreclosed for postmodem artists who are
able to meet the Second Circuit's parody definition. From the reasoning
in Rogers, it is apparent that a successful parodist may presumptively count
two of the four factors, character of use and the amount copied, in favor of
fair use.
4. Effect on Market Value
The fourth fair use factor examines the effect of the infringing work
on the market value of the original. In Stewart v. Abend,' the Supreme
Court noted that market value is the "most important, and indeed, central
fair use factor." 3 The court of appeals formulated a balancing test based
on the economic underpinnings of the Copyright Act: "[A] balance must
be struck between the benefit gained by the copyright owner when the
copying is found an unfair use and the benefit gained by the public when
the use is held to be fair."'  Under this analysis, the adverse impact on
the owner of the original work weighs inversely with the public benefit.
Therefore, if the impact on the original is slight in economic terms, less
public benefit needs to be shown to justify fair use. 5  This analog of the
Inverse Ratio RuleU6 contains an inherent bias against commercial use.
250. Rogers, 960 F.2d at 311.
251. Id at 310; see supra notes 229-39 and accompanying text.
252. 495 U.S. 207 (1990).
253. Id at 238 (quoting 3 MmELtE NmMR & DAVID NMMER, NMMR ON COPYRIGHT
13.05[A] (1990)); see also Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566
(1985).
254. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 311 (2d Cir. 1992).
255. Id. at 311-12.
256. The Inverse Ratio Rule is a common law doctrine that is used by many courts in an
infringement analysis. According to the Rule, proof of access has an inverse relation to proof of
substantial similarity. If solid evidence of access can be established, a lesser showing of similarity
is required to sustain a finding of copying. Conversely, if two works are substantially similar to
a great degree, proof of access is not necessary. The Rogers court, by creating an Inverse Ratio
Rule as a fair use factor, essentially balanced the tension between the conflicting policies
underlying copyright law. This test was first advanced by the Supreme Court in Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984).
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In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,' the Supreme
Court held that "every commercial use of copyrighted material is presump-
tively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the
owner of the copyright ... ..'
Relying on this balancing test, the Second Circuit focused on whether
"Koons' work is primarily commercial in nature." 9 In such a case, the
only showing required is that "if the unauthorized use becomes 'wide-
spread' it would prejudice [the] potential market for [the original]
work."' ' The owner of the underlying work does not have to prove
actual harm in the marketplace; potential harm to the market for derivative
works is sufficient. 1 Differences in medium are irrelevant, as they are
elsewhere in copyright analysis, since the marketplace for the protected
expression encompasses photographs, sculptures, and all other forms of
reproduction. If Jeff Koons could show that the market for a photograph
is not affected by a sculpture, the fair use exception would in fact swallow
the intent of the Copyright Act. Only expression is protected by copyright
law. Focusing on differences in media that do not affect the expressive
quality of a work would destroy copyright law.
It may be possible for future postmodern artists to distinguish
Rogers, based once again on Koons' blatant commercial motivation. In
disposing of this factor, the court relied on the facts in evidence and may
have narrowed the scope of its holding: "Here there is nothing in the
record to support a view that Koons produced 'String of Puppies' for
anything other than sale as high-priced art. Hence, the likelihood of future
harm to Rogers' photograph is presumed, and plaintiff's market for his
work has been prejudiced."' 26 Therefore, the court concluded, prejudice
will follow automatically from the presumption attached to commercial use.
If the presumption can be avoided, or if the commercial motivation of the
use can be tempered in evidence, this factor may not militate against fair
use. Koons' use was so extreme on the commercial end of the spectrum
257. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
258. Id at 451.
259. Rogers, 960 F.2d at 312.
260. Id; see also Sony, 464 U.S. at 451 (1984); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 568 (1985).
261. Rogers, 960 F.2d at 312.
262. Id
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of use that Rogers may not serve as a benchmark for future analysis of the
effect on market value. 3
E. Remedies
Once infringement has been established in a case involving
postmodern art, the issue of damages can be especially crucial. The
Copyright Act allows the copyright owner to elect to recover statutory
damages in lieu of the infringer's actual profits.2 "6 This provision may
seriously undercut the ability of artists to produce works for fear that it may
have severe financial consequences. Furthermore, courts are empowered
to fashion equitable relief as necessary, up to and including the destruction
of the infringing works.' This type of relief potentially has serious
effects on the postmodern artist, who, despite an infringement, has made a
purposeful commentary on the appropriated work. In other words, the
remedy can result in the destruction of this type of art.2'
263. Any plaintiff in an analogous infringement action would assert that the art market is
necessarily commercial and all artists must harbor some commercial motivation. This argument
holds some merit, especially in light of the economic justifications for the Copyright Act. The
failure of Rogers, however, may be that no quantum of commercial interest was identified that
would separate fair from unfair use. Defendants are not prevented by this decision from arguing
that their motives were not sufficiently commercial to invoke the presumption of prejudice. If
their position can be distinguished from that of Jeff Koons, the line of reasoning followed in the
market-effect cases may need to be abandoned.
264. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (1988). The copyright owner would only elect statutory damages
if they would exceed the infringer's actual profits; if the infringer's profits exceeded the statutory
maximum of $100,000 for willful infringement, statutory damages are obviously a less attractive
option for the copyright owner to pursue. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (1988); see also infra notes 267-
84 and accompanying text.
265. 17 U.S.C. § 503 (1988).
266. Liability in Rogers potentially could be extended to Sonnabend Gallery, which was
named as a co-defendant. Under the doctrine of contributory infringement, "one who, with
knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes, or materially contributes to the infringing
conduct of another, may be held liable as a 'contributory' infringer." Gershwin Publishing Corp.
v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971). If the gallery knew
that Koons had infringed Rogers' copyright, Rogers would be able to recover from the gallery as
well. In Rogers, the evidence did not show that Sonnabend had any knowledge of the source for
"String of Puppies." Rogers v. Koons, 751 F. Supp. 474, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). In the future,
galleries may need to closely scrutinize works which they suspect may contain appropriated
elements to determine the extent of their exposure to an infringement claim.
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1. Statutory Damages
A successful plaintiff in an infringement action may elect to recover
statutory damages. Recovery is limited to amounts between $500 and
$20,000 "as the court considers just."2 67 This award can be increased to
$100,000 if the court finds proof of willful infringement.268 Attempting
to recover for willful infringement is a risky proposition, however, since the
court has the discretion to reduce the award to $200 if willfulness is not
shown.269 In cases where a less commercially successful artist infringes,
electing statutory damages permits a greater award than would probably be
calculated from actual damages.
Since Jeff Koons sold each sculpture for more than the upper limit
on statutory damages,27 there was no incentive for Art Rogers to elect
this option. The purpose of this provision is to allow recovery even where
the infringer has not realized a financial gain. Had Koons been unable or
unwilling to sell "String of Puppies," Rogers would still have a measure of
recovery. In cases that may arise from infringement by appropriation,
statutory damages will be the likely method of recovery. Few contempo-
rary artists command Koons' prices, but the deterrent effect of fixed
penalties will reach all strata of the art world. Artists should consider the
extent of their liability in terms of statutory damages; it is not sufficient to
dismiss potential infringements because the resulting work is not commer-
cially viable.
2. Actual Damages
Where the infringer has benefitted financially from the infringement,
the successful plaintiff will often elect to recover actual damages. This
method of recovery calculates the actual damages as well as the net profits
gained from the infringement:27' "In establishing the infringer's profits,
the copyright owner is required to present proof only of the infringer's
gross revenue, and the infringer is required to prove his or her deductible
267. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (1988).
268. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (1988).
269. I
270. Koons sold three sculptures for a total of $367,000. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301,305
(2d Cir. 1992). This exceeds the statutory limit of $100,000. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (1988).
271. 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (1988).
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expenses and the elements of profit attributable to factors other than the
copyrighted work."2
In calculating actual damages, "the primary measure of recovery is
the extent to which the market value of the copyrighted work at the time
of the infringement has been injured or destroyed by the infringement."'
The legislative intent for recovery of actual damages was "to compensate
the copyright owner for losses suffered as a result of the infringement, and
also allowed for the award of the profits of the infringer to prevent the
infringer from unfairly benefiting from its wrongful act." 4 Although the
court of appeals remanded the calculation of damages to the district court,
it suggested that "a reasonable license fee for the use of 'Puppies' best
approximates the market injury sustained by Rogers as a result of Koons'
misappropriation." 5  Other circuits have adopted similar guidelines for
recovery. In Deltak Inc. v. Advanced Sys., Inc.,2 6 the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals ruled that "[tihe value of the infringer's use is a
permissible basis for estimating actual damages." 2" The Ninth Circuit,
in Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald's Corp.,27 also
incorporated the value of the infringer's use into the tabulation of actual
damages.29
The determination of apportioned profits hinges on many factors that
can decrease the award to the plaintiff. The statute expressly permits the
infringer to establish elements of profit that are not attributable to the
infringed work. The Second Circuit in Rogers listed factors such as
"Koons' own notoriety and his related ability to command high prices for
his work.... To the extent that Koons is able to prove that the profits at
issue derive solely from his own position in the art world, he should be
allowed to retain them."'2 0 Profit deduction in analogous circumstances
has been allowed by the Ninth Circuit?" and in other Second Circuit
272. Id
273. Fitzgerald Publishing Co. v. Baylor Publishing Co., 807 F.2d 1110, 1118 (2d Cir. 1986).
274. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 161 (1976)) (emphasis deleted).
275. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 313 (2d Cir. 1992).
276. 767 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1985).
277. Id at 360-61.
278. 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
279. Id at 1174.
280. Rogers, 960 F.2d at 313 (citations omitted).
281. In Frank Music Corp. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc., 886 F.2d 1545, 1549 (9th Cir.
1989), the court noted that "[w]here a defendant alters infringing material to suit its own unique
purposes, those alterations and the creativity behind them should be taken into account in
apportioning the profits of the infringing work."
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cases. 2  Therefore, the reputation and market status of an infringing
artist may greatly impact on the resulting recovery. No such determination
has yet been made in Rogers; the case has been remanded to the district
court for determination of damages.'
Thus, electing to pursue actual damages in postmodern infringement
actions may not be an effective route to recovery. The market value of the
infringed work may not be high, especially when compared to available
statutory damages. Moreover, profits realized by the infringer may be
attributed to elements independent of the infringement and may not be
included in the damage calculation. Applying this reasoning, the Second
Circuit hinted broadly that plaintiff Rogers should abandon his claim to
actual damages: "Finally, we note that Rogers remains at liberty to elect
statutory damages in lieu of an award of actual damages and apportioned
profits. In fact, given Koons' willful and egregious behavior, we think
Rogers may be a good candidate for enhanced statutory damages ..... ,2
3. Equitable Relief
Courts are not limited to fashioning monetary relief in infringement
cases. The Copyright Act expressly permits courts great discretion in
directing equitable relief where appropriate. 5  In Rogers, the district
court ordered Koons to ship the artist's copy of "String of Puppies" to
Rogers. Koons contested the order, but the court of appeals found no abuse
of discretion in the trial judge's decision." Given the wide latitude
available to the trial court in such cases, artists who infringe run the risk of
losing their works as part of the judgment. Instead of ordering a transfer
of the work, courts may also order the destruction of any infringing
work. 7 It would have been within the discretion of the district court to
have ordered Koons to destroy "String of Puppies." Although exercise of
these equitable powers is rare when works of art are at issue, the legal
effect of the Copyright Act is to permit destruction of art to protect
generalized economic interests. The chilling effect of such a remedy is
considerable if artists are not willing to run the risk of losing their art.
282. See, e.g., ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1983).
283. Rogers, 960 F.2d at 313.
284. 1& (citation omitted).
285. 17 U.S.C. § 503 (1988).
286. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 313 (2d Cir. 1992).
287. 17 U.S.C. § 503 (1988).
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Thus, the impact of Rogers may be to severely restrict the growth of one
of the most prominent artistic movements of the twentieth century.
V. THE FUTURE OF POSTMODERNISM
A. The Second Circuit's Object Test
The Second Circuit's new definition of parody has already wended
its way into the legal consciousness, at least in the Sixth Circuit. Acuff-
Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell,288 decided four months after Rogers,
applied the object test to define a rap song performed by 2 Live Crew as
a parody for copyright purposes. 9 The Court of Appeals reversed the
district court's finding that the 2 Live Crew song "Pretty Woman" was a
parody under the Rogers definition: "[E]ven accepting that 'Pretty Woman'
is a comment on the banality of white-centered popular music, we cannot
discern any parody of the original song."''  The court accepted the
object test and expressly narrowed the parody definition in accord with
Rogers.29? ' This decision was appealed, however, and the Supreme Court
granted a writ of certiorari to address "[w]hether petitioners' commercial
parody was a 'fair use' within the meaning of 17 U.S.C. Section 107."'2n
Unless the Supreme Court reverses Acuff-Rose or limits the Rogers
parody definition, the object test will present a major obstacle for
postmodem artists who assert a valid fair use defense. Some parodies that
use "found objects" plainly show the underlying work to be an object of the
parody.293 Others, like Koons' sculpture, overwhelm the underlying work
to impart their message. Under the object test, purely social criticism is not
a valid fair use if it uses an appropriated object, unless the criticism is
clearly directed at that object. Koons asserted that his intent was to
criticize the mass market for sentimentalized postcard photographs.2'
288. 972 F.2d 1429 (6th Cir. 1992).
289. Id
290. Id at 1436 & n.8.
291. Id.
292. 113 S. Ct. 1642 (1993).
293. Duchamp's "LHOOQ," for instance, consists of Leonardo Da Vinci's "Mona Lisa" with
two alterations: the model is wearing a penciled-in moustache, and the picture is captioned with
the letters "LHOOQ," which when pronounced in French produces an off-color pun. JANSON,
supra note 22, at 693.
294. See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310 (2d Cir. 1992); but cf. supra note 180 and
accompanying text (Koons' claim at having lifted photograph "to new vocabulary," debatably a
different artistic purpose than Rogers'.).
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While the artistic success of his endeavor is arguable, for purposes of fair
use his sculptures are an ineffective parody because they fail to point out
the distinct expression in the underlying work.
B. Exclusive Rights of Copyright Owner
Postmodern works classified under the protection of the Copyright
Act can still infringe the exclusive rights of the owners of appropriated
preexisting works. Copyright holders are granted five exclusive rights.29
Any postmodern artist who utilizes found objects or appropriates the work
of others needs to be concerned about the rights to reproduction and to
create derivative works. Public performance rights, which are limited to
certain types of works,2' may not be available to some performance
artists. Therefore, the emphasis and intent of some performance art may
need to be altered if the artist wishes to retain the exclusive right to public
performance.297
295. The Copyright Act defines those rights as:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work... ;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work...;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the
copyrighted work publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual
images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted
work publicly.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988).
296. The Copyright Act gives the exclusive right, "in the case of literary, musical, dramatic,
and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to
perform the copyrighted work publicly." 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (1988).
297. The two remaining rights, the right to distribution and the right to public display, are
outside the scope of this Article. Distribution rights were relevant to Rogers v. Koons only to the
extent that defendant Koons infringed by distributing four copies of Rogers' protected work.
Koons was within his rights, under the First Sale Doctrine, to send the notecard containing
"Puppies" to his Italian studio. The First Sale Doctrine, a limitation on the right to distribution,
states that "the owner of a particular copy [of a work] ... is entitled, without the authority of the
copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy .... 17 U.S.C. §
109(a) (1988). The addition to the marketplace of four sculptural versions of "Puppies," while
technically a violation of Rogers' right, is de minimis in comparison to the effect of the
infringement. Public display rights are granted for every type of protected work except for whole
motion pictures. Since no aspect of postmodem art falls outside of the scope of the display right,
there are no material issues for the postmodern artist. The relationship between Sonnabend
Gallery and Jeff Koons, including the right to display, is relevant only to the extent of damages
that can be recovered from the gallery. For the purposes of this Article, it is sufficient that the
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For postmodern artists, the potential for infringement is quite high.
Often, direct evidence of copying is available, since artists who use "found
objects" emphasize the appropriation as part of the meaning of the work.
Without proof of direct copying, a finding of substantial similarity can still
lead to liability for infringement. The test for substantial similarity, which
is based on the judgments of the lay observer, does not consider artistic
merit or relative aesthetic differences.
29
1. Reproduction Rights
The owner of a copyright for any type of protected work enjoys the
exclusive right to reproduce the work.2' The plain language of the
Copyright Act prevents another artist from exploiting Art Rogers' photo-
graphs or Andy Warhol's paintings. In the case of visual works, reproduc-
tion rights allow the holder of the copyright to produce copies and prints
of the original work. Since the statute limits reproductions to "copies or
phonorecords,"3° performance artists can only enjoy this right in terms
of reproducing a script, plan or videocassette recording. If the performance
results in a visual work, however, such as a painting or an installation, the
artist retains the exclusive right to reproduce the resulting work. "Earth-
works" artists can prevent others from reproducing their works in the same
location with the same materials; it is doubtful, though, that infringement
could be proved in a situation that was not nearly identical. 1
2. Public Performance Rights
Performance artists, especially in recent years, have created their
brand of art in front of paying or invited audiences in theaters that, on other
occasions, present more conventional forms of dance and drama.3 2 The
Copyright Act of 1976 limits the types of works that can be protected in
their public performances. Public performances of "literary, musical,
dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and
gallery exhibited Koons' infringing sculptures with the artist's permission.
298. See Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960)
("[Whether] the ordinary observer, unless he set out to detect the disparities, would be disposed
to overlook them, and regard their aesthetic appeal as the same.").
299. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (1988).
300. Id
301. See supra notes 71-87 and accompanying text.
302. See Jalon, supra note 92; Span & Hall, supra note 95.
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other audiovisual works"30 3 are reserved exclusively to the copyright
owner. The Act specifically excludes protection in this area for pictorial
and sculptural works, both of which are otherwise given basic protec-
tion.3 4 In addition, courts have held that "nondramatic" performances of
dramatic works do not fall within the exclusive right of public perfor-
mance.
305
It is not difficult for performance artists such as Karen Finley and
Annie Sprinkle 3 6 to satisfy the statutory requirements for the public
performance right. Finley's recent shows have included dramatic mono-
logues and choreographic elements.3'7  At the very least they can be
classified as an advanced form of pantomime cum social commentary; at
best, they are dramatic performances of a multimedia literary work that
includes choreographic elements. Artists who follow in the tradition of
Chris Burden or Vito Acconci, however, may not be able to reserve their
rights to perform their works."8 An artist who wished to duplicate or
update Burden's "Shoot,"3 "1 for example, would not enjoy the right to
prevent others from public performance of that work. The idea itself is not
a valid subject for copyright and cannot be protected in any form. 3'0 The
key issue is whether the "performance" or the resulting photographs
constitute the intended work. Since most courts will probably not identify
dramatic or choreographic elements in being shot in the arm, performances
like these may not be protectable expression.
Similar performances may meet the same fate, even though the
resulting pictorial work is indistinguishable from its creation. From a
policy standpoint, the exclusion of pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works
303. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (1988).
304. See supra notes 118-34 and accompanying text.
305. See Robert Stigwood Group Ltd. v. Sperber, 457 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1972) (allowing
ASCAP licensees to perform nondramatic musical works); April Prods., Inc. v. Strand Enters.,
Inc., 221 F.2d 292 (2d Cir. 1955) (medley of songs in cabaret act nondramatic within license).
306. Annie Sprinkle is an ex-adult film star and self-described prostitute who performs
sexually explicit material in performance spaces and theaters nationwide. Brian Bradley, Annie
Sprinkle: Post-post Porn Modernist, BACK STAGE, Sept. 20, 1991, at 48.
307. "We Keep Our Victims Ready" performed in the winter of 1990 at the Walker Arts
Center in Minneapolis, Minnesota, consisted of two acts. In Act One, Finley delivered a social
commentary on abortion rights and religion. In Act Two, Finley removed her clothing and
smeared herself with chocolate and tinsel while reciting a monologue comparing herself to a veal
calf. Span & Hall, supra note 95. "We Keep Our Victims Ready" has since been performed in
a nationwide tour by Finley and has generated considerable publicity.
308. See supra notes 88-113 and accompanying text.
309. Jalon, supra note 92, at 93.
310. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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from the performance right prevents the abuse of copyright protections. If
performance rights in pictorial works were protected, Jackson Pollock's
demonstrations of drip paintings' could serve to foreclose public use of
that technique by other artists. Since the Copyright Act excludes from
protection "any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation,
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is
described, explaine4 illustrate, or embodied in such work,"3 ' it would
be inconsistent to extend protection to the creation of works of art that
happened to be in the context of a public performance. Pollock could not
expect to enjoy a copyright monopoly over his style of painting, even if he
had charged admission and created drip paintings in Carnegie Hall.
Likewise, any method of artistic creation is explicitly exempt from
protection, even if the act of creation is itself a performance. Therefore,
while the result of Chris Burden's gunshot wound qualifies as a pictorial
work, no rights can be claimed over the process he used.
Performance art that is directed toward the creation of an independent
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work runs the risk of falling outside the
scope of the public performance right. Such a performance can be
separated into protected and unprotected elements, so that the portions of
a performance that meet statutory guidelines will have the performance
right attached.3" If there are no separable aspects to the performance,
though, the policy disfavoring protection for modes of creation will deny
protection.
C. Difficulties in Obtaining Copyright Protection: Fixation
For a work to be protected under the Copyright Act, it must be fixed
in a tangible medium of expression." 4 The fixation requirement presents
problems for postmodern artists only in a few disciplines. No fixation
difficulties arise in the case of photographs, paintings, sculptures, or
installations. The Copyright Act requires only that fixation occur "in any
tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which
311. See JANSON, supra note 22, at 695-96. Jackson Pollock was a highly influential
American abstract expressionist painter who pioneered the "drip painting" in the late 1940's, in
which paint was dribbled onto a canvas in seemingly random combinations. See generally ELLEN
LANDAU THAMES & HUDsON POUNDS, JACKSON POLLOcK (1990); STEvEN HA*IH & GREGORY
WHITE SMrIH, JACKSON Pou.cLjz AN AMERICAN SAGA (1990).
312. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988) (emphasis added).
313. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
314. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988).
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(a work] can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicat-
ed .... 3 " Fixation normally requires some form of mechanical
recording or documentation. The fixation must be "sufficiently permanent
or stable... for a period of more than transitory duration." 
3 6
A work consisting of sounds or images, including stage performances
of all types, may be fixed in several different ways. Often, a written script,
choreographic records, or sheet music can suffice as fixation for a work
performed in public. The Copyright Act also allows transmissions of such
works to be fixed if they are recorded or otherwise captured "simultaneous-
ly" with transmission.317 For two types of postmodern art, the fixation
requirement presents an obstacle that may deny protection to some artists.
Performance art, except when staged in a controlled setting, may only
be fixable if other records are made of the performance. Works such as
Vito Acconci's "Following Piece""3 I are not structured enough to satisfy
the fixation requirements on their own. Acconci purposefully followed
random pedestrians around New York. There was no script, no choreo-
graphed movements, and thus no tangible fixation. Acconci made written
notes of his encounters, and in many cases took photographs of his
subjects; these elements were combined into a final presentation. As a
whole, the presentation is copyrightable, since written records and the
photographs are sufficient fixation. By extension, the performance through
which Acconci generated the records is fixed for copyright purposes.
Much performance art, however, is staged in a single performance
and may not be sufficiently fixed. To gain protection for works performed
in spaces like "d.c. space" in Washington, D.C. 319 and Los Angeles
Contemporary Exhibitions,3' artists would have to show evidence of a
script that was followed or a choreographed plan. Otherwise, artists would
be required to videotape their performances. Performance art, as defined
by the art community, encompasses far more than the stage work of Karen
315. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988).
316. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
317. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). The definition of simultaneity has been expanded to include
transmissions that are not actually recorded. See National Football League v. McBee & Bruno's,
Inc., 792 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986) (fixation of "dirty" satellite transmission accomplished by
recording "clean" transmission).
318. See supra note 107.
319. "d.c. space" is a performance space that first opened in late 1977 as a combination
restaurant, "new-music showplace, and art gallery." It is credited with revitalizing the
Washington, D.C. arts scene in the late 1970's. Jo Ann Lewis, The Arts Downtown: The Scene's
Getting Busier on F Street, WASH. PosT, Jan. 7, 1978, at El.
320. See Jalon, supra note 92; Span & Hall, supra note 95.
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Finley or the shows of Tim Miller's Highways Performance Space in Santa
Monica, California.32 Artists perform on street comers, in small clubs,
or any place where they desire to express themselves. Under copyright law,
these performances are not fixed, and thus they cannot be given protection.
The settings exploited by the "Earthworks" artists presents similar
fixation problems for their works. Christo's "The Umbrellas" 322 was
planned to be transitory, and its tenure was foreshortened considerably
when a spectator died on the project site.30  The fixation of "The
Umbrellas" is not an issue, since very precise plans were followed in the
placement, arrangement, and selection of the umbrellas. Photographs,
blueprints, and books fully document the planning and execution of the
project. 24  The nature of Christo's works necessitates such rigorous
planning. Wrapping islands in pink plastic or erecting miles of fence
requires detailed instructions.
Likewise, Robert Smithson's "Spiral Jetty,"3" an intricate spiral
design of molded earth, was the result of a detailed blueprint. When
Smithson dumps dirt down a hillside, though, it is not clear what documen-
tation would suffice to fix the resulting mass of earth. The transitory nature
of such work does not satisfy the "sufficiently permanent or stable"3
language of the Copyright Act. Photographs are normally taken to record
these events, but protection may extend only to the photographs themselves.
Temporarily transforming nature may be seen by some courts to be part of
the process of arranging the subject matter for a photograph and not as an
artistic creation by itself. Clearly, a photograph of a natural landmark, such
as Half Dome in Yosemite National Park, does not entitle the photographer
to claim any rights over the mountain itself. Even if the photographer
alters his subject matter by arranging rocks or dirt, another photographer
cannot be prevented from capturing the scene on film. No court has as yet
determined where the line can be drawn between arranging the environment
to create art and creating art by arranging the environment. The difficulty
to fix such a work in a tangible medium may render this distinction moot.
321. See lalon, supra note 92. Tim Miller is a Los Angeles-based performance artist who,
in 1989, co-founded Highways performance space in Santa Monica. Jan Breslauer, LA. In Their
Rear-View Mirrors, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 16, 1994, at F7.
322. See supra notes 71-73, 83-87 and accompanying text.
323. See supra note 86.
324. Christo marketed and licensed copies of his plans and drawings to be sold as souvenirs,
alongside the requisite T-shirts and miniature umbrellas. Scale models of the project have been
exhibited in galleries in Southern California. Colker, supra note 86, at Bl.
325. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
326. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
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Consequently, "Earthworks" artists must be quite careful to document their
works if they desire copyright protection.
D. Defenses Available After Rogers
Rogers will adversely affect postmodern art. A solid precedent has
now been established for future plaintiffs to bring infringement claims
against artists.32 To defend against such claims, artists still have two
lines of defense that were left open in Rogers' wake: parody and non-
commercial use. Works that satisfy the Second Circuit's object test for
parody stand a good chance of asserting a successful fair use defense."2
Similarly, if the purpose behind the art and the motives of the artist can be
distinguished factually from the behavior of Jeff Koons, several of the fair
use factors may fall into place in favor of the defendant.3 29
More ominously, though, the Rogers decisions may have a chilling
effect that extends well beyond the courtroom. Many contemporary artists
regularly practice forms of appropriation and utilize "found objects." It is
now inadvisable for postmodern artists to create works while remaining
oblivious to copyright laws. Art Rogers, in asserting his rights under the
law to protect his financial interest in his expression, has broken down the
barrier which separated the economic justifications of copyright law from
the aesthetic traditions of postmodern art.
E. Decisions Since Rogers
For Jeff Koons, the Rogers decisions may spell the end of his career
as a practitioner of "found" art. In two separate cases, both relating to
works Koons created for the same show that featured "String of Puppies,"
Koons was found to have infringed underlying works.3 In Campbell v.
Koons,331 Koons once again commissioned a sculpture to be made from
a photograph. In this instance, Koons purchased a notecard of Barbara
Campbell's "Boys with Pig" and sent it to the same Italian studio that
327. See Campbell v. Koons, 1993 U.S. Dist. IEXTS 3957 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); United Feature
Syndicate, Inc. v. Koons, 817 F. Supp. 370, 376 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301
(2d Cir. 1992).
328. See supra notes 215-39 and accompanying text.
329. See supra notes 213-63 and accompanying text.
330. Campbell v. Koons, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3957 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); United Feature
Syndicate, Inc. v. Koons, 817 F. Supp. 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
331. 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3957 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
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created "String of Puppies. ' 31 The district court, noting the overwhelm-
ing similarity to Rogers, held for Campbell as a matter of law: "Tis case
needs little discussion, for it is substantially identical to Rogers v. Koons
S.. ."3 The court rejected Koons' fair use defenses just as quickly:
'The Second Circuit's decision in Rogers v. Koons also forecloses, as a
matter of law, Koons' asserted affirmative defenses of Fair Use and
Parody .... ,,I Koons was ordered to send all copies of the infringing
sculpture to Campbell, as well as "any photographs or representations there-
of."
3 35
In United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. Koons,336 Jeff Koons commis-
sioned four sculptures entitled "Wild Boy and Puppy."337 The "puppy"
in each sculpture was a representation of "Odie," a character in the
syndicated comic strip "Garfield."338  Koons freely admitted that he
directly copied "Odie" into his sculptures.3 39 Unlike in Campbell, the
district court did not find this case to be on all fours with Rogers, although
the Second Circuit's opinion was cited as a "helpful framework."'
Following a standard infringement analysis, summary judgment was granted
for plaintiff United Feature Syndicate." Rogers was cited extensively
by the court in its rejection of Koons' fair use and parody defenses. 2
The court concluded by holding that "[in sum, drawing all reasonable
inferences in defendant's favor, there is no evidence which would allow a
reasonable factfinder to rule for the defendant on the issue of copyright
liability in the instant case."
3
332. 1& at *2. Barbara Campbell is a professional photographer with over 20 years of
experience in commercial photography. I& at *5.
333. Id. at *6.
334. Id at *7.
335. Id at *9.
336. 817 F. Supp. 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
337. Ie at 371.
338. Id.
339. "According to Koons, he designed the sculpture by cutting out a color picture of 'Odie'
(the 'Puppy') and placing it next to a cut-out image of a stuffed doll (the 'Wild Boy') to form a
collage which was used as the design for the sculpture." ld at 372.
340. Md at 376.
341. United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. Koons, 817 F. Supp. 370, 376 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
342. Id at 377-82.
343. Id. at 385.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Rogers was the first case to confront the tension that exists between
contemporary art and copyright law." Under a traditional copyright
analysis, it would be difficult to disagree with the judgment against Jeff
Koons. Koons admittedly appropriated Art Rogers' copyrighted photograph
and sold the resulting work for $367,000. By any infringement
standard, Koons infringed on Rogers' copyright. Furthermore, the fair use
defense does not apply because of Koons' commercial motivation and his
artistic stance, which equates the aesthetic value of art with its financial
value.346
Unfortunately for postmodem artists, these decisions have created a
dangerous precedent that may erode artistic freedom. While it is laudable
that Jeff Koons will no longer reap the rewards of other artists' talent,
many other artists may be forced to subjugate artistic inspiration to fear of
infringement. With Rogers as a precedent, it might not have been possible
for Andy Warhol to propel Pop Art into a worldwide phenomenon with his
soup cans. 7  Marcel Duchamp's "The Fountain ' 3" and "LHOOQ '349
may not have stood up before the Second Circuit's object test for parody.
The artistic philosophy of artists like Duchamp and Warhol have influenced
artists in such diverse media as performance art and "Earthworks." Without
pieces like 'The Fountain '350 and Andy Warhol's series of paintings of
351soup cans, contemporary art would no doubt be vastly different today.
Thus, Rogers presents a serious obstacle to all practitioners of
postmodemism. If given the opportunity, a court may be sympathetic to
postmodern ideology and reinterpret copyright law to allow some leeway
for use of "found objects" and other postmodern techniques. In Rogers,
however, the Second Circuit refused to look past Jeff Koons' financial
344. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
345. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
346. See supra notes 213-63 and accompanying text.
347. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
348. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
349. See supra note 293 and accompanying text.
350. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
351. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
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motives and his disregard for copyright law. 352 In suing Jeff Koons, Art
Rogers has successfully asserted his copyright, but the basis for that
decision may severely impair the development of contemporary art.
Steven Shonack"
352. See supra notes 215-28, 267-70 and accompanying text.
* The author wishes to thank his family and friends for their encouragement, love, and
support throughout the writing process. The author also expresses his appreciation to the editors
and staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Journal for their long hours and their
energetic participation in the tireless saga of editing of this article.
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